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Abstract
The vulnerability of deep-learning based face-recognition (FR) methods, to presentation attacks (PA) is stud-
ied in this paper. Recently proposed FR methods based on deep neural networks (DNN) have been shown to
outperform most other methods by a significant margin. In a trustworthy face-verification system, however, max-
imizing recognition-performance alone is not sufficient – the system should also be capable of resisting various
kinds of attacks, including presentation-attacks (PA). Previous experience has shown that the PA-vulnerability
of FR systems tends to increase with face-verification accuracy. Using several publicly available PA datasets, we
show that DNN-based FR systems compensate for variability between bona fide and PA samples, and tend to score
them similarly, which makes such FR systems extremely vulnerable to PAs. Experiments show the vulnerability
of the studied DNN-based FR systems to be consistently higher than 90%, and often higher than 98%.
1 Introduction
Progress of face recognition (FR) technology, from strongly constrained models to fully unconstrained environments,
has been enabled by the adoption of successively complex learning paradigms. The first generation of large scale
appearance based FR systems, such as Eigenfaces [1] and Fisherfaces [2], attempted to model the face-variability in
a simple linear sub-space. Subsequently, methods such as joint factor analysis (JFA), inter-session variability (ISV)
modeling [3] and probabilistic linear discriminant analysis (PLDA) [4, 5] were developed to better model variability
in face-images. Deep-learning based methods, notably convolutional neural networks (CNN) [6, 7, 8, 9], have become
very popular in recent years, due to their near-perfect recognition accuracy on unconstrained datasets such as ‘labeled
faces in the wild’ (LFW) [10].
A FR system may be used in two kinds of applications: face-identification or face-verification. Face-identification
is a one-to-many problem, where the face-image to be identified is tested against all previously enrolled identities, to
see if it matches any of the known identities. In face-verification systems, a claimed-identity is provided along with
the input face-image, and the problem is simply to verify that the input image corresponds to the claimed-identity.
In this paper the terms recognition and verification have been used interchangeably, and refer to the use of a FR
system in verification mode.
FR systems should not only have very high accuracy, but should also be robust to attacks. For example, in
access-control applications, high FR recognition accuracy in unconstrained environments is not a significant asset,
when not accompanied with resistance to presentation attacks (PA), also known as spoof-attacks. A face PA is said
to have occurred when a face biometric-sample is presented to the camera of a FR system “with the intention of
interfering with the operation of biometric recognition” [11]. For example, person A may attack a FR system by
claiming to be an enrolled client, B, and presenting a printed photo of the person B to the camera. Other examples
of PAs are: digital photos or videos displayed on an electronic screen, face sketches, and make-up [12].
Most high-accuracy FR systems today rely on deep-learning methods. Indeed, deep-learning based FR systems
are already being deployed in commercial face-verification applications [8]. In this context their vulnerability to PAs
becomes an important factor in the trustworthiness of the entire face-verification process. Several studies [6, 7, 8, 9]
have explored the capacity of deep-learning based FR-systems to handle variations in pose, illumination and scale,
that is, challenges related to variability of face-biometric samples of a single client. Karahan et al. [13] studied the
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fragility of CNN-based FR systems when confronted with image degradations such as blurring, occlusion, compression-
artifacts, and color-distortion. Robustness to such degradations is necessary for FR systems operating in relatively
unconstrained environments. For face-verification systems functioning under controlled conditions, the vulnerability
to PAs is a much more significant concern.
The European research project TABULA RASA [14] indicated a positive correlation between the efficacy of FR
systems and their vulnerability to PAs. In other words, FR methods with higher face-verification accuracy tended
to be more vulnerable to PAs. Given that FR systems, especially the popular CNN-based FR methods, have not
been explicitly trained for presentation attack detection (PAD), one would intuitively expect such systems to be
vulnerable to PAs. To our knowledge, though, the vulnerability of deep learning based FR systems to PAs has not
been studied in detail.
In this paper we present a large-scale empirical study of the vulnerability to PAs of five recent FR systems,
including 3 recent CNN-based methods. Specifically, we compare the vulnerability of the following systems:
• three CNN-based FR systems, namely:
– VGG-Face [7],
– LightCNN [15], and
– FaceNet [16]
• Intersession Variability (ISV) modeling [3], and
• ROC-SDK from Rank-One Computing1.
The main contribution of this paper is empirical evidence to support the claim that the CNN-based FR method is
extremely vulnerable to PAs. Our experiments, using three recent PA datasets, show that other highly rated FR
methods are also very vulnerable to PAs. Another significant contribution of this work is that all the datasets,
protocols, and source-code for the experiments reported in the paper will be made publicly available on the web.
This will allow other researchers to reproduce the results presented here.
A brief review of previous vulnerability studies for FR methods is presented in Section 2. This discussion justifies
the present work, and helps us to offset our results from those in previous published works. The face-recognition
methods included in our study are described in Section 3. The experiments reported in this paper have been
conducted on publicly available datasets, with well-defined protocols for face-recognition and face-PAD experiments.
In Section 4, we describe the datasets, the kinds of PAs represented in each dataset, and the protocols for training
and testing face-recognition offered in each dataset. Experimental results are summarized and discussed in Section
5, and concluding remarks are presented in Section 6.
2 Related Work
There have been very few studies specifically exploring the vulnerability of FR systems to different kinds of attacks.
Duc et al. [17] have investigated the vulnerability of FR based login on computers (specifically Lenovo, Toshiba and
Asus products) to PAs. Kose et al. [18] present a study of the vulnerability of FR methods to 3D-mask attacks. They
evaluate two different FR methods – one designed specifically for FR using 3D data [19], and, a generic approach
to FR using local binary patterns (LBP) based face-image comparison. Hadid [20] discusses the vulnerability of
the parts-based GMM FR method to PAs. In a recently published work, Scherhag et al. [21], the authors have
studied the vulnerability of FR methods to morphed-face attacks. Here attacks are constructed by morphing face
images from two enrolled identities, and the challenge is to see if the two enrolled identities can both be successfully
spoofed using the same morphed image. Both FR methods tested in this work – VeriFace SDK2 (a commercial off-the
shelf (COTS) FR product from Neurotechnology), and OpenFace [22] (an open-source, pre-trained DNN based FR
system) – are shown to be highly susceptible to such attacks [21].
Although deep-learning based FR systems have attracted considerable attention, both academic and commercial,
as far as we are aware, no previous study has investigated the vulnerability of CNN-based FR systems using a variety
of PAs. Most of the studies cited above have been performed on FR methods that rely on hand-crafted features.
1Company website: www.rankone.io
2Website: www.neurotechnology.com/verilook.html
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The study by Scherhag et al. [21] that has included a DNN based FR system (OpenFace) was done in the restricted
context of a single class of attacks based on morphed-images. Such attacks are expected to have a very narrow range
of application.
In this paper, we focus on the vulnerability of CNN based FR methods to PAs. This study includes three publicly
available pre-trained CNN-FR models. Our experiments demonstrate that all these FR methods are consistently
highly vulnerable to several classes of PAs. For comparison, we have also included the ISV modeling method, which
relies on hand-crafted features, and ROC-SDK – a COTS FR product – in this study. We use four publicly available
FR and PA datasets to estimate the vulnerability of the five FR methods to a variety of PAs. Our study has been
motivated by the hypothesis that although CNN-FR systems outperform FR methods based on hand-crafted features,
they are also more vulnerable to PAs. This assertion makes intuitive sense to researchers in face-biometrics, given
that the FR methods have not been explicitly trained to detect PAs. However, this is the first large-scale study to
empirically quantify the vulnerability of these FR methods.
3 FR Systems Included In This Study
A typical FR system functions in three phases: training, enrollment, and probing. In the training phase a background
model, assumed to broadly represent the space of face-images, is constructed using training data. In the enrollment
phase, the FR system generates templates for the given enrollment samples, which are then stored in the gallery. In
the probing (operational) phase, the FR system is presented with a probe-image and a claimed identity. A template
is created for the given probe-sample, and is compared with the set of enrolled templates associated with the claimed
identity. The result of the comparison is a score, which is then thresholded to produce a decision (accept or reject).
To mitigate the influence of variations on the actual face-recognition process, the raw input image is usually
preprocessed, to extract sub-images representing individual faces. Geometric and color transforms may also be
applied to the extracted face-images, depending on the requirements of the specific FR method. The result of the
pre-processing stage is a normalized face image, of predefined size and scale, that may be processed by a FR system.
Before describing the different FR methods, we explain the pre-processing steps applied to normalize the input face
images.
3.1 Face Image Normalization
Several FR systems expect the input to be a gray-level image. Therefore, our first pre-processing step is to convert
the input RGB image to a gray-level image (essentially, the Y component of the YUV domain representation of the
image).
The next step is to locate each face represented in the input image. The ROC-SDK takes a full frame image
as input. For the other FR methods in our study (CNN-FR, and ISV modeling) the input is a suitably cropped
face-image. There are two ways to accomplish the face-localization step explicitly:
• provide additional information, such as annotations for specific facial landmarks, that the FR system can use
to extract a normalized face-region, or,
• provide as input a cropped and normalized face-image.
In our experiments, the normalized face-region is extracted using annotations identifying the center of each eye.
Imposing the constraints that the straight-line joining the two eye-centres should be horizontal, and should have a
predefined length, an affine transform can be used to extract a normalized face-image of fixed size from the given
input image. Some face-biometrics test datasets include annotations for the eye locations. For datasets where this
information is not explicitly provided, we use a two-step process to extract the eye-positions. First, a boosted-
classifier, trained to detect faces, is used to localize the face-region [23]. Next, facial-landmarks are extracted from
the face-region using the flandmarks method [24]. This method provides pixel coordinates for seven facial landmarks,
including the two corners of each eye. The pixel-location for the center of each eye can be interpolated from these
landmarks.
Note that for the VGG-Face and LightCNN networks, the input images are normalized color (RGB) images,
whereas the FaceNet and ISV modeling method expect normalized gray-level face-images of fixed 2D-shape.
The various FR methods are discussed in the following sections. Specific implementation details, such as the size
of the normalized face-image, tunings of the hyper-parameters, and so on, are provided in the Section 5.
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3.2 CNN-Based Systems
CNNs [25, 26], a class of deep neural networks (DNN), have been shown to be extremely accurate in FR tasks. For
FR applications, CNNs are usually trained for face identification, using face-images as input, and the set of identities
to be recognized as output. The last few layers of the network, including the output layer, are typically fully-
connected (fc for short) layers. These layers may be seen as the classifier-stage of the network, whereas the preceding
(convolutional and pooling) layers may be considered to constitute the feature-extraction stage. Although CNNs
are typically trained end-to-end for classification or regression tasks, they are often also used as feature-extraction
tools. The terms representation and embedding are used interchangeably, to denote the outputs of the various layers
of a deep network. Representations generated by a specific layer of a pre-trained DNN may be used as templates
(feature-vectors) representing the corresponding input images. These templates may be subsequently be used to
train a classifier, or to compare the respective input images using appropriate similarity measures.
Taigman et al. [6] have proposed DeepFace, a 9-layer CNN for FR. The input faces are first aligned to have an
upright position using 3D modeling and piecewise affine transforms, before being fed to the network. This network
achieves a recognition accuracy of 97.25% on the LFW dataset. Schroff et al. [8] report an accuracy of 99.63% on the
LFW dataset using FaceNet, a CNN with 7.5 million parameters, trained using a novel triplet loss function. Other
CNN architectures showing similar FR accuracy on the LFW dataset include the DeepID series by Sun et al. [9].
In this work we analyze the vulnerability to PAs of three CNN-FR methods: the VGG-Face [7], LightCNN [15],
and FaceNet [16]. The VGG-Face network has been included in our study because it is a very well known and
widely referenced CNN for FR applications. The other two network models have been included because they are
newer than the VGG-Face network, and have both shown a FR performance even better than that of the VGG-
Face CNN. Another important reason why these three specific CNNs have been studied in this work is that the
respective creators of these networks have made publicly available pre-trained models that can be directly used in
our experiments. The following sections provide brief summaries of the selected CNNs, and describe how they have
been used in our experiments.
3.2.1 VGG-Face CNN
The VGG-Face network model is made publicly available by the Visual Geometry Group3 at Oxford University.
Involving almost 135 million trainable parameters, this network has been shown to achieve a FR accuracy of 98.95%
on the LFW unrestricted setting [10]. VGG-Face is a CNN consisting of 16 hidden layers (see Table 3 in [7]).
The initial 13 hidden layers are convolution and pooling layers, and the last three layers are fully-connected (’fc6’,
’fc7’, and ’fc8’, following the nomenclature used by Parkhi et al. [7]). The input to this network is an appropriately
cropped color face-image of pre-specified dimensions.
We use the representation produced by the ’fc7’ layer of the VGG-Face CNN as a template for the input image.
When enrolling a client, the template produced by the VGG-Face network for each enrollment-sample is recorded.
For verification, the network is used to generate a template for the probe face-image, which is then compared to
the enrolled templates of the claimed identity using the Cosine-similarity measure given by Equation 1 (where ‖A‖2
represents the L2-norm of vector A).
Cosine Similarity(A,B) =
A ·B
‖A‖2 · ‖B‖2 (1)
The score assigned to the probe is the average Cosine-similarity of the probe-template to all the enrollment-templates
of the claimed identity. If the score is larger than a predetermined threshold, the probe is accepted as a match for
the claimed identity.
3.2.2 LightCNN
Wu et al. [15] have proposed a new CNN, called LightCNN, for FR. Their goals in designing this network were to
have significantly fewer trainable parameters compared to other state-of-the-art FR-CNNs, as well as to be able to
handle noisy labels that are inevitable in datasets mined automatically from the web. Compared to the VGG-Face
network, the number of parameters in the LightCNN model is smaller by a factor of 10 (∼ 12 million parameters).
This is achieved mainly through the use of a newly introduced Max-Feature-Map (MFM) activation [15], which is a
3Website: www.robots.ox.ac.uk/˜vgg/software/vgg_face
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non-linear extension of the maxout activation operation. Although the MFM operator is more expensive to compute
than the ReLU unit that it replaces, the large overall reduction of number of units per layer, made possible by the
use of the new operator, still leads to smaller computation time for the forward-pass of the LightCNN network (by
a factor of 5, relative to the VGG-Face CNN [15]).
In our experiments we use as templates the 256-D representation produced by the ’eltwise fc1’ layer of LightCNN.
Note that this template is much smaller than the 4096-D vector produced by VGG-Face. Despite these relative
efficiencies, the LightCNN network achieves a FR accuracy of 99.33% on the LFW dataset (in unrestricted setting)
– outperforming the VGG-Face network by a small margin. As with the VGG-Face network, the Cosine measure
(Eqn. 1) is used to compare an input probe template to the relevant enrollment templates.
3.2.3 FaceNet CNN
Very recently, David Sandberg has made publicly available his implementation as well as trained models for a new
FR-CNN named FaceNet [16]. This is the closest open-source implementation of the FaceNet CNN proposed by
Schroff et al. [8], for which neither a pre-trained model nor the training-set is publicly available. Sandberg’s FaceNet
implements an Inception-ResNet V1 DNN architecture [27]. Two pre-trained FaceNet models have been published
[16]. In our tests, we have used the 20170512-110547 model, trained on the MS-Celeb-1M dataset [28]. Using this
model, FaceNet achieves a FR performance of 99.2% on the LFW dataset [16], which is comparable to the performance
of LightCNN. Note that the 128-D representation produced by this network (at the ’embeddings:0’ layer) is half the
size of that produced by LightCNN. We use this representation to construct enrollment and probe templates, which
are compared to each other using the Cosine measure (Eqn. 1).
3.3 GMM-based FR using Inter-Session Variability Modeling
Inter-session variability modeling (ISV) is an extension of the Gaussian Mixture Models (GMM) based method for
face verification. We have used the ISV modeling approach proposed by Wallace et al. [3]. Among the FR methods
included in this study, this is the only method that adopts a parts based approach. The input normalized face
image is first decomposed into a set of square sub-images of size (12 × 12), with an overlap of 11 pixels in each
direction. Let N represent the total number of sub-images extracted from the input face-image. For each sub-image,
a predetermined number, D, of low-frequency DCT (discrete cosine transform) coefficients is computed. Thus, a set
of N D-dim arrays of DCT coefficients is extracted for each input face-image. The DCT coefficients are normalized
to zero-mean and unit standard-deviation in each of the D dimensions. The resulting set of N normalized D-dim
DCT arrays is used to represent the input face-image.
To use a GMM for FR, first, a universal background model (UBM) is constructed from the set of training-images
(each represented by N D-dim DCT arrays). The UBM is a GMM, that is, a weighted sum of K Gaussians, where
each Gaussian is represented by a D-dim mean-vector, and a (D×D)-dim covariance-matrix. The parameters of the
Gaussians components of the UBM, as well as their relative weights, are learned from the training data. The UBM
describes the probability distribution of face sub-images in the D-dim DCT-coefficient space.
A supervector, m, is then constructed by concatenating K the mean-vectors of all the components of the GMM.
To enroll a client i, a supervector si is derived as follows:
si = m+ di , (2)
where di is an offset-vector specific to client i, computed using maximum a posteriori (MAP) adaptation from the
UBM [29].
The supervector si is assumed to be client-specific. In other words, different enrollment images of the same client,
i, should, in theory, produce very similar supervectors. For a given client, however, enrollment set typically contains
images captured in different sessions, with varying pose, illumination, and facial expressions. This within-class
variability for client i is also reflected in si, and can result in diminished recognition accuracy of the GMM-based
FR method [3].
ISV-modeling has been developed to enhance the GMM based approach by explicitly modeling and suppressing
the within-class variability of each enrolled client. We assume that each enrollment image, collected in a separate
session, results in a unique supervector. For enrollment image (i, j) (the jth enrollment image of client i), let
µi,j = m+ ui,j + di , (3)
5
where µi,j is the supervector corresponding to the enrollment image (i, j), ui,j is the offset induced by specific session
conditions of image (i, j), and di is the client-dependent offset. (Note that the client-dependent offset di in Eqn. 3
is free from session variability, unlike the di in Eqn. 2.) The session-dependent offset, ui,j can be expressed as:
ui,j = Uxi,j , (4)
where, U is a low-dimensional matrix modeling the session-variability, and xi,j ∼N (0,I) is a latent variable corre-
sponding to the session-variability. Similarly, the client-dependent offset, di, can be represented as
di = Dzi , (5)
where D is a diagonal matrix derived from the diagonal variances of the UBM, and zi ∼N (0,I) is a client-specific
latent random variable. The subspace U is estimated using an expectation-maximization (EM) algorithm. For
details of the ISV technique for face-verification, please refer to the works of Wallace et al. [3] and Vogt et al. [30].
When enrolling a new client, i, using a set of enrollment images (indexed by j), the latent variables xi,j and zi
are estimated from the enrollment images, and finally, the client-specific supervector, ci, is computed as:
ci = m+Dzi . (6)
Thus, a single supervector, ci, is stored for each enrolled client.
Given a probe image, P, claiming identity, i, the classification score for the probe is computed as the log-likelihood
ratio LLR(P, ci) as follows:
LLR(P, ci) = Q(P|ci)−Q(P|UBM) , (7)
where, Q(P|ci) gives the log of the likelihood of the probe P being generated by the model ci, and similarly,
Q(P|UBM) gives the log of the likelihood of the probe P being generated by the UBM. In practice, we use the
linear scoring method [31] to compute the score. This faster scoring method is derived as a first order Taylor series
approximation of the normal log-likelihood ratio. The probe is accepted if the resulting score is higher than a preset
threshold.
3.4 ROC-SDK from Rank One Computing
This FR product, from Rank-One Computing, has been included in our study as it is one of the best performing
COTS FR products today [32]. In particular, Rank-One Computing have demonstrated a FR performance of 92%
(@ false reject rate = 1%) on the LFW dataset [33], and of 98% (@ false reject rate = 1%) on the NIST Special
Database 32: Multiple Encounter Dataset (MEDS) [34]. The software development kit (SDK) distributed by the
company includes two FR methods – ROCFR (a pose-independent FR system), and, ROCID (a FR system for images
captured under controlled conditions). Here, we have tested the ROCFR method from the SDK (version 1.9). This
method represents every face-image with a 144-byte template. The SDK provides functions for populating a gallery
with enrollment templates, and for comparing probe-templates to the gallery of previously enrolled templates.
4 Experiment Datasets and Protocols
Each FR system is evaluated under two scenarios: licit and attack. In the licit scenario, where only bona fide samples
are considered, the face-verification accuracy of the FR system is evaluated. Identities are enrolled in the system
using a set of enrollment samples and the verification performance of the system is determined using the probe
samples from various identities. In the attack scenario we consider PA samples for the identities enrolled using the
licit protocol, to evaluate the vulnerability of the system to PAs. That is, when evaluating the vulnerability of a FR
system, each enrolled identity is only probed with PAs on that identity. The datasets and protocols used to evaluate
the performance of each FR system are described in this section. We start by presenting the metrics used to quantify
the performance of each FR system under the two scenarios.
4.1 Performance Metrics
During the verification process, the user provides a biometric sample as probe, along with a claimed identity. Samples
presented to a biometric verification system fall into three categories:
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• Genuine: when the biometric sample and the claimed identity both belong to the user being authenticated;
• Zero-effort Impostor (ZEI): when the biometric sample belongs to the user, but the user claims the identity of
a different enrolled client;
• Impostor presentation attack (PA): when the biometric sample matches the claimed identity, but neither
correspond to the user attempting to be verified.
In standardized biometrics terminology [11], both genuine and ZEI presentations are considered bona fide presen-
tations. The task of a FR system is to accept only genuine presentations, and to reject both types of impostor
presentations.
The verification performance of a FR system is reported using the false match rate (FMR), and the false non-
match rate (FNMR) [35]. The FMR denotes the proportion of ZEI that are wrongly accepted as genuine samples
(Type-I error). The FNMR refers to the proportion of genuine samples which are wrongly rejected (Type-II error).
The two metrics may be summarized in a single number as the Half Total Error Rate (HTER) as HTER = (FMR+
FNMR)/2.
Vulnerability of a biometric system to PAs is reported as the Impostor Attack Presentation Match Rate (IAPMR) [35],
which denotes the proportion of PAs that are accepted by the FR system as genuine presentations.
4.2 Datasets
We have used four publicly available datasets, namely, MOBIO [36], REPLAY-ATTACK [37], MSU-MFSD [38], and
REPLAY-MOBILE [39].
The MOBIO dataset [36] was collected for bi-modal (voice and face) biometric verification experiments using
mobile devices. Therefore, it contains only licit protocols. Biometric samples were collected in the year 2010, using
Nokia N93i mobile phones, for 100 male subjects and 52 female subjects, spread over six cities (in five countries).
The videos have been recorded at a resolution of (320×240) pixels. Experimental results reported in this paper have
been produced using face-images from only the male subjects.
The REPLAY-ATTACK [37] face PA dataset, published in 2012, consists of 1, 300 videos (each, at least 9 seconds
long) from 50 subjects. The videos have been recorded by using a 13′′ Macbook at 320× 240 pixel resolution, under
two different lighting conditions. Three kinds of replay attacks are simulated in this dataset, namely, printed photo
attacks, still face-images displayed on an electronic device, and replayed digital-videos. Three presentation attack
instruments (PAIs) have been used to construct the attacks: photo-quality paper (for the printed photo attacks),
iPhone 3Gs, and iPad (first generation). The two electronic devices have been used for both, photo- as well as
video-attacks. Videos for each kind of attack have been captured under two conditions, one where the capturing
device is hand-held, and the other where the capturing device rests on a stationary support.
The public version of the MSU-MFSD dataset [38] includes real-access and attack videos for 35 subjects. This
dataset was published in 2015. Real-access videos (∼ 12 sec. long) have been captured using two devices: a 13′′
MacBook Air (using its built-in camera), and a Google Nexus 5 (Android 4.4.2) phone. Videos captured using the
laptop camera have a resolution of 640× 480 pixels, and those captured using the Android camera have a resolution
of 720 × 480 pixels. The dataset also includes PA videos representing printed photo attacks, mobile video replay-
attacks where video captured on an iPhone 5s is played back on an iPhone 5s, and high-definition (HD) video-replays
(captured on a Canon 550D SLR, and played back on an iPad Air).
Published in 2016, The REPLAY-MOBILE dataset [39] is the newest of the three PA datasets used here. This
dataset contains short (∼ 10 sec. long) HD (720 × 1280) resolution videos corresponding to 40 identities, recorded
using two mobile devices: an iPad Mini 2 tablet and a LG-G4 smartphone. The videos have been collected under
six different lighting conditions, involving artificial as well as natural illumination. PAs represented in this database
have been constructed using two PAIs: matte-paper for print-attacks, and matte-screen monitor for digital-replay
attacks. For each PAI, two kinds of attacks have been recorded: one where the user holds the recording device in
hand, and the second where the recording device is stably supported on a stand. Thus, four kinds of attacks are
represented in the database.
The various PAs represented in the three PA datasets are summarized in Table 1. In this table, PA I refers to
printed photo attacks, PA II refers to low-quality replay attacks, and PA III denotes high-quality replay attacks.
Figure 1 shows some example PAs from each PA dataset. The first column shows examples of bona fide presentations.
The remaining three columns show examples of selected PAs represented in the corresponding dataset.
7
Table 1: Different combinations of PA in each dataset. PA I refers to printed photo attacks in the dataset, PA
II refers to low-quality video replay attacks, and PA III corresponds to high-quality video replay attacks. The
REPLAY-MOBILE dataset contains only two PA types: PA I and PA III. Low-quality video replay attacks have
not been included in this dataset. 7
Dataset PA I PA II PA III
REPLAY-ATTACK
Capture Device 12.1 mega-pixel CanonPowerShot SX150 IS camera 3.1 mega-pixel iPhone 3GS camera 3.1 mega-pixel iPhone 3GS camera
PAI Triumph-Adler DCC 2520color laser printer
iPhone 3Gs (320× 480 pixels)
(165 ppi pixel density)
iPad (768× 1024 pixels)
(132 ppi pixel density)
Capture Conditions 2 lighting conditions (’normal’ (bright) and ’adverse’ (in the shade, but not dark))Hand-held or fixed
Biometric sensor Macbook (320× 240)
MSU-MFSD [31]
Capture Device Canon 550D camera 8 mega-pixel iPhone 5S camera Canon 550D camera
PAI HP Color LaserjetCP6015xh printer
iPhone 5s (640× 1136 pixels)
(326 ppi pixel density)
iPad Air (1536× 2048 pixels)
(264 ppi pixel density)
Capture Conditions Indoors, with artificial lighting
Biometric sensor Macbook Air (640× 480), Nexus 5 (720× 480)
REPLAY-MOBILE [32]
Capture Device 18 mega-pixel Nikon Coolpix P520 LG-G4 (720× 1280)
PAI Konica Minolta ineo+224e color laser printer
Philips 227ELH matte
monitor (1920× 1080)
Capture Conditions 6 lighting conditions (including artificial lights and natural light)Hand-held or fixed
Biometric sensor iPad Mini 2 (720× 1280), LG-G4 (720× 1280)
TABLE I: Different combinations of PA in each dataset. PA I refers to printed photo attacks in the dataset, PA II refers
to low-quality video replay attacks, and PA III corresponds to high-quality replay attacks. The REPLAY-MOBILE dataset
contains only two PA types: PA I and PA III. Low-quality video replay attacks have not been included in this dataset.
evaluation group. In the vulnerability analysis experiments
using a given PAD dataset, attack-videos in the evaluation
group of the corresponding PAD protocol are used to test
the vulnerability of the FR system in question.
The three groups in the male protocol of the MOBIO
dataset are constructed as follows:
• training: 7881 samples images, from 37 subjects,
• development 2760 samples, from 24 subjects, and
• evaluation: 4370 samples, from 38 subjects.
As mentioned before, samples for the MOBIO dataset were
collected at six different sites. Each group contains data
exclusively from two sites.
The REPLAY-ATTACK dataset comes with a licit pro-
tocol consisting of 100 videos (one video per subject, per
illumination condition), and several PAD protocols. The licit
protocol is partitioned thus:
• training: two videos each, from 15 subjects,
• development: two videos each, from 15 subjects, and
• evaluation: two videos each, from 20 subjects.
The dataset also provides several PAD protocols [30]. In
our experiments we have considered the grandtest protocol,
which includes all PAs. This protocol consists of 200 bona
fide presentations, and 1, 000 PAs (i.e., a total of 1, 200
videos).
The public version of MSU-MFSD [31] offers 70 bona
fide presentation videos and 280 attack videos. As mentioned
before, no licit protocol has been published for this dataset.
For our experiments, therefore, we have devised a new licit
protocol using some frames from the bona fide presentation
videos. For each subject, the dataset contains two bona
fide presentation videos, one captured using a Macbook Air
(labeled ”laptop”) and the other using a smart-phone (labeled
”android”). To construct the licit protocol for this dataset, we
have used 10 frames from each bona fide video, sampled
evenly, between the first and 180th frame. Frames from the
”laptop” videos form the enrollment set, and those from the
”android” videos form the probe set.
The licit protocol of the REPLAY-MOBILE dataset con-
sists of 160 videos (four videos for each of 40 subjects).
They are grouped as follows: 48 videos (12 subjects) for
training, 64 videos (16 subjects) for development, and the
remaining 48 videos for the test group. The PAD protocol
of the dataset consists of 1, 030 videos (390 bona fide
presentations and 640 PAs of different kinds).
For ease of reference, the number of clients and samples
used in the licit and attack protocols of the various datasets
is summarized in Table II.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
The general procedure for evaluating the vulnerability of
a FR system is as follows. First the face-verification perfor-
mance of the system is evaluated using only the MOBIO
dataset (i.e., in the licit scenario). The hyper-parameters of
the FR system are tuned to achieve optimal discrimination
between genuine presentations and ZEI presentations. The
vulnerability of the FR system to PAs is then evaluated, for
the different PAD datasets, using the same hyper-parameter
settings.
In this section we first describe the methodology adopted
for the experiments. Then, we present the results of face-
recognition and vulnerability analysis for the four selected
FR systems.
A. Methodology
The face-recognition and vulnerability-analysis experi-
ments have been performed using the Bob5 signal-processing
and machine-learning toolkit [33]. Besides a wide selection
of machine-learning and signal processing tools relevant
for biometics experiments, the Bob toolkit also includes
interfaces for accessing the various datasets and associated
protocols. All the FR systems studied here have been tested
within the same software framework.
5Website: www.idiap.ch/software/bob/
4.3 Protocols
As mentioned before, the MOBIO dataset comes with only a licit protocol, whereas the PA datasets include both licit
and at ack protocols. For our experiments with the MSU-MFSD, we have construct d new licit and attack protocols
to analyze the vulnerability of the FR methods to PAs. The protocols in the various atasets are described in his
section.
The set of clients in the licit protocol of each dataset is divided into three mutually exclusive groups: training,
development and evaluation. The training group is reserved for producing the background models, when necessary.
In our experiments, the UBM required for the ISV modeling method has been trained using the training group in
the licit protocol of the MOBIO dataset. The training groups in the licit protocols of the PA datasets are ignored
here. The development and evaluation groups, each consist of two sets of samples: an enrollment set and a probe set.
All clients assigned to the group are represented in both sets. That is, for each client in the development group, a
certain number of enrollment samples as well s prob samples are available (and likewise, for the evaluation group).
Attack protocols of the various PA datasets also consist of three non-overlapping groups: training, development,
and evaluation. The training group is intended to be used for training a PAD method. The development group can
be used for tuning the parameters of the PAD method being tested, and the final performance metrics are reported
for the evaluation group. In the vulnerability analysis experiments using a given PA dataset, attack-videos in the
evaluation group of the corresponding PAD protocol are used to test the vulnerability of the FR system in question.
The three groups in the male protocol of the MOBIO dataset are constructed as follows:
training: 7881 sampl s images, from 37 subjects,
• development: 2760 samples, from 24 subjects, and
• evaluation: 4370 samples, from 38 subjects.
As mentioned before, samples for the MOBIO dataset were collected at six different sites. Each group c ntains data
exclusively from two sites.
The REPLAY-ATTACK dataset comes with a licit protocol consisting of 100 videos (one video per subject, per
illumination condition), and several PAD protocols. The licit protocol is partitioned thus:
• training: two videos each, from 15 subjects,
• development: two videos each, from 15 subjects, nd
• valuation: two videos each, fro 20 subj cts.
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Figure 1: Examples of attacks represented in the various PA datasets. The first column shows a bona fide example,
and the remaining columns show different types of PAs present in the dataset for the same identity. The various PAs
are described in Table 1.
The dataset also provides several PAD protocols [37]. In our experiments we have considered the grandtest protocol,
which includes all PAs. This protocol consists of 200 bona fide presentations, and 1, 000 PAs (for a total of 1, 200
videos).
The public version of MSU-MFSD [38] offers 70 bona fide presentation videos and 280 attack videos. As mentioned
before, no licit protocol has been published for this dataset. For our experiments, therefore, we have devised a new
licit protocol using some frames from the bona fide presentation videos. For each subject, the dataset contains two
bona fide presentation videos, one captured using a Macbook Air (labeled ”laptop”) and the other using a smart-
phone (labeled ”android”). To construct the licit protocol for this dataset, we have used 10 frames from each bona
fide video, sampled evenly, between the first and 180th frame. Frames from the ”laptop” videos form the enrollment
set, and those from the ”android” videos form the probe set.
The licit protocol of the REPLAY-MOBILE dataset consists of 160 videos (four videos for each of 40 subjects).
They are grouped as follows: 48 videos (12 subjects) for training, 64 videos (16 subjects) for development, and the
remaining 48 videos for the test group. The PAD protocol of the dataset consists of 1, 030 videos (390 bona fide
presentations and 640 PAs of different kinds).
For ease of reference, the number of clients and samples used in the licit and attack protocols of the various
datasets is summarized in Table 2.
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Table 2: Composition of the licit and attack protocols of the four datasets used in our experiments. All protocols
consist of three mutually exclusive groups of clients: training, development, and evaluation. For each dataset, the
number of clients assigned to each group is listed here. The number in parentheses shows the total number of samples
for the corresponding dataset and group. 8
Dataset Licit protocol Attack protocolTrain Development Evaluation Train Development Evaluation
MOBIO 37 (7881) 24 (2760) 38 (4370)
REPLAY-ATTACK 15 (90) 15 (90) 20 (120) 15 (300) 15 (300) 20 (400)
MSU-MFSD 10 (200) 10 (200) 15 (300) 10 (600) 10 (600) 15 (900)
REPLAY-MOBILE 12 (1680) 16 (2240) 12 (1580) 12 (1920) 16 (2560) 12 (1920)
TABLE II: Composition of the licit and attack protocols of the four datasets used in our experiments. All protocols consist
of three mutually exclusive groups of clients: training, development, and evaluation. For each dataset, the number of clients
assigned to each group is listed here. The number in parentheses shows the total number of samples for the corresponding
dataset and group.
The inputs for ISV modeling, Gabor-Graph, and ROC-
SDK FR methods are gray-scale images, and the input to the
VGG-Face FR method is a color (RGB) image. The ROC-
SDK takes the entire image (one frame of video) as input.
All other FR methods expect the input-image to be cropped
appropriately, so that it contains only the face-region, with as
little of the background as possible (see Section II-A). The
specific input image dimensions required by the various FR
systems, are listed in Table III. The table also summarizes
the hyper-parameters and the scoring method used in each
FR system. For the ISV modeling method and the Gabor-
Graphs method, we have used the hyper-parameter values
recommended by Gu¨nther et al. [34].
Most FR methods utilize models that need to be trained
before deployment. The ROC-SDK and the VGG-Face net-
work come pre-trained, and can be used out-of-the-box. No
background model is required for the Gabor-Graphs method.
For the ISV modeling method, the UBM and the session-
variability matrix (U) are trained using face-images in the
male-protocol of the MOBIO dataset.
Once trained, the FR methods are tuned and evaluated
using the MOBIO licit protocol, and the three PA datasets:
REPLAY-ATTACK, MSU-MFSD, and REPLAY-MOBILE.
For experiments with each of these datasets, the hyper-
parameters of each FR method are tuned using data in the
development group of the licit protocol (see Section III).
Each client in this group is enrolled into the FR system,
using the available enrollment samples. Then, all samples in
the probe set of the development group are tested against
every enrolled client. For every enrolled identity, some
videos in the probe-set come from the same client, and
are considered genuine presentations, whereas the remaining
videos (corresponding to other clients) constitute the ZEI
attacks on this identity. Thus, we obtain two sets of scores,
one for genuine presentations, and the other for ZEI presen-
tations. The hyper-parameters of each FR method are tuned
to maximize the separation between the two sets of scores. A
score-threshold is now selected, based on these two score-
sets computed from the probe set of development group.
Presentations resulting in scores smaller than the score-
threshold are rejected, and those at or above the threshold
are accepted. Thus, given a score-threshold, the FMR and
FNMR of the FR system can be estimated.
The score-threshold may be chosen arbitrarily, but usually
some heuristics are applied when choosing the threshold.
Two common approaches for selecting the score-threshold
are:
• Select the score-threshold, TEER, corresponding to the
equal error rate (EER). That is, TEER is the threshold
for which FMR ≈ FNMR.
• Select the score-threshold, Tθ, that corresponds to
a specific FMR = θ (e.g., T0.1 denotes the score-
threshold leading to a FMR of 0.1% over the devel-
opment group).
Next, the clients in the evaluation group are enrolled into
the FR system using the data in the corresponding enroll-
ment set, and samples in the probe set are used to generate
scores for genuine and ZEI presentations. (Note that the
groups are all mutually exclusive. That is, clients represented
in the development group are not present in the evaluation
group, and vice versa.) For a given evaluation-probe, if
the resulting score is smaller than the score-threshold, the
probe is rejected. Otherwise it is accepted. Thus, using the
evaluation-probe scores, the FMR and FNMR of the FR
method can be reported.
5 Experiments
The procedure used here to evaluate the vulnerability of a FR system is as follows. First the face-verification
performance of the system is evaluated using only the MOBIO dataset (i.e., in the licit scenario). The hyper-
parameters of the FR system are tuned to achieve optimal discrimination between genuine presentations and ZEI
presentations. The vulnerability of the FR system to PAs is then evaluated, for the different PA datasets, using
the same hyper-parameter settings. In this section we first describe the methodology adopted for the experiments.
Then, we present the results of face-recognition and vulnerability analysis for the five selected FR systems.
5.1 M thodology
Table 3: Summary of the parameters of the various FR systems used in this study. All methods, apart from ROC-
SDK, expect input-images of fixed dimensions, where the image has been cropped to the face-region appropriately.
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The inputs for ISV modeling, Gabor-Graph, and ROC-
SDK FR methods are gray-scale images, and the input to the
VGG-Face FR method is a color (RGB) image. The ROC-
SDK takes the entire image (one frame of video) as input.
All other FR methods expect the input-image to be cropped
appropriately, so that it contains only the face-region, with as
little of the background as possible (see Section II-A). The
specific input image dimensions required by the various FR
systems, are listed in Table III. The table also summarizes
the hyper-parameters and the scoring method used in each
FR system. For the ISV modeling method and the Gabor-
Graphs method, we have used the hyper-parameter values
recommended by Gu¨nther et al. [34].
Most FR methods utilize models that need to be trained
before deployment. The ROC-SDK and the VGG-Face net-
work come pre-trained, and can be used out-of-the-box. No
background model is required for the Gabor-Graphs method.
For the ISV modeling method, the UBM and the session-
variability matrix (U) are trained using face-images in the
male-protocol of the MOBIO dataset.
Once trained, the FR methods are tuned and evaluated
using the MOBIO licit protocol, and the three PA datasets:
REPLAY-ATTACK, MSU-MFSD, and REPLAY-MOBILE.
For experiments with each of these datasets, the hyper-
parameters of each FR method are tuned using data in the
development group of the licit protocol (see Section III).
Each client in this group is enrolled into the FR system,
using the available enrollment samples. Then, all samples in
the probe set of the development group are tested against
every enrolled client. For every enrolled identity, some
videos in the probe-set come from the same client, and
are considered genuine presentations, whereas the remaining
videos (corresponding to other clients) constitute the ZEI
attacks on this identity. Thus, we obtain two sets of scores,
one for genuine presentations, and the other for ZEI presen-
tations. The hyper-parameters of each FR method are tuned
to maximize the separation between the two sets of scores. A
score-threshold is now selected, based on these two score-
sets computed from the probe set of development group.
Presentations resulting in scores smaller than the score-
threshold are rejected, and those at or above the threshold
are accepted. Thus, given a score-threshold, the FMR and
FNMR of the FR system can be estimated.
The score-threshold may be chosen arbitrarily, but usually
some heuristics are applied when choosing the threshold.
Two common approaches for selecting the score-threshold
are:
• Select the score-threshold, TEER, corresponding to the
equal error rate (EER). That is, TEER is the threshold
for which FMR ≈ FNMR.
• Select the score-threshold, Tθ, that corresponds to
a specific FMR = θ (e.g., T0.1 denotes the score-
threshold leading to a FMR of 0.1% over the devel-
opment group).
Next, the clients in the evaluation group are enrolled into
the FR system using the data in the corresponding enroll-
ment set, and samples in the probe set are used to generate
scores for genuine and ZEI presentations. (Note that the
groups are all mutually exclusive. That is, clients represented
in the development group are not present in the evaluation
group, and vice versa.) For a given evaluation-probe, if
the resulting score is smaller than the score-threshold, the
probe is rejected. Otherwise it is accepted. Thus, using the
evaluation-probe scores, the FMR and FNMR of the FR
method can be reported.
TABLE III: Summary of the parameters of the various FR systems used in this study. All methods, apart from ROC-SDK,
expect input-images of fixed dimensions, where the image has been cropped to the face-region appropriately.
FR Metho Input Features Hyper-parameters Comparison Metric
VGG-Face 224× 224 Output of ‘fc7’ layer None Cosine distance measure
color image length 4096 (pre-trained CNN)
LightCNN 128× 128 Output of ‘eltwise fc1’ layer None Cosine distance measure
gray image length 256 (pre-trained CNN)
FaceNet 160× 160 Output of ‘embeddings:0’ layer None Cosine distance measure
Model: 20170512-110547 color image length 128 (pre-trained CNN)
ISV 80× 64 Session-variability-compensated #GMMs: 512; Dim. of session- Log likelihood ratio
gray image supervector, length ∼ 45K variability subspace, U: 160
R C-SDK (v1.9) arbitrary size Undisclosed, proprietary Using FRONTAL, FR, PARTIAL, Undisclosed, proprietary
gray image size ∼ 140 bytes and ROLL filters
The ROC-SDK as well as the three CNN-FR methods
(VGG-Face, LightCNN, and FaceNet) c me pre-trained, and
can be used out of the box. The UBM and the e sion-
variability m trix (U in Eqn. 4) for the ISV modeling m thod
are trained using training set in the licit male-protocol of the
MOBIO dataset.
For experi ents with each datas t, the hyper-parameters
of eac FR method are tuned using data in the development
group of the licit protocol (see Section IV). The score-
threshold may be chosen arbitrarily, but usually some heuris-
tics are applied when choosing the threshold. Two common
approaches for selecting the scor -thr shold are:
• Select the score-threshold, TEER, corresponding to the
equal error rate (EER). That is, TEER is the hreshold
for which FMR ≈ FNMR.
• Select the score-threshold, Tθ, that corresponds to a
specific FMR = θ (e.g., T0.1 denotes the score-threshold
leading to a FMR of 0.1% over the development group).
F r a given score-threshol obtained n the development
group, the FMR, FNMR, and HTER can be reported o the
e aluation g ou .
B. Face Verification Performance
First, we establish a baseline face-verification performance
for each FR system, based on the licit protocol of the MO-
BIO dataset. The face-verification results of the various FR
systems are presented in two ways: using receiver operating
characteristics (ROC) curves and using expected performance
curves (EPC) [41]. The ROC curves shown in Figure 2
illustrate the face-verification performances of the various
FR systems. They have been evaluated using the licit male-
protocol of the MOBIO dataset. Figure 2(a) and (b) show
the ROC plots for the development group and evaluation
group, respectively. A score-threshold, T0.1, is selected so
as to achieve a FMR of 0.1% over the development group.
This is indicated in Figure 2(a) by a dashed black vertical
line. In Figure 2(b) the circular markers in the various colors
(connected by a dashed trace line) indicate the FMR of the
corresponding FR methods for the score-threshold T0.1. To
compare the performances of the five FR methods on t
eval ation group at scor -threshold T0.1, we should consider
the distanc s of these five poi ts from the top left corner
of the plot (where (FMR,FNMR) = (0, 0), representing
the ideal outcome). This way of comparing different FR
systems is similar to the method used by NIST [31]. It is
clear from the ROC plots that the FaceNet CNN significantly
outperforms the other FR methods in this study. Expected
performance curves (EPC) [41] provide an unbiased compar-
ison of FR systems. Figure 3 shows the EPC plots of the
five FR systems. These curves have been computed using
the licit protocol of the MOBIO dataset, and show how the
performance of each FR method evolves as a function of
the trade-off betw en FMR and FNMR. This rade-off is
The FR and vulnerability-analysis experiments have been performed using the Python based Bob4 signal-
processing and machine-learning toolkit [40, 41]. Besides a wide selection of machine-learning and signal processing
tools relevant for biometics experiments, the Bob toolkit also includes interfaces for accessing the various datasets
and associated protocols. All the FR systems studied here have b en t sted within the same software framework.
The inputs for the LightCNN, ISV modeling and ROC-SDK FR methods are gray-scale images, and the input to
the VGG-Face and FaceNet FR methods is a color (RGB) image. The ROC-SDK takes the entire image (one frame
of video) as input. All other FR methods expect the input-image to be cropped appropriately, so that it contains only
the face-region, with as lit l of the ba kgro nd as possible (see Section 3.1). The specific input image dimensions
required by the various FR systems, are list d in Table 3. The table also summarizes the hyper-parameters and the
scoring method used in each FR system. For the ISV modeling m thod, we have used the hyper-parameter values
recommended by Gu¨n her et al. [42].
The ROC-SD as well as the three CNN-FR methods (VGG-Face, LightCNN, and FaceNet) come pre-trained,
and can be used out of the box. The UBM and t e session-variability matrix (U in Eqn. 4) for the ISV modeling
4Website: www.idiap.ch/software/bob/
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method are trained using training set in the licit male-protocol of the MOBIO dataset.
For experiments with each dataset, the hyper-parameters of each FR method are tuned using data in the devel-
opment group of the licit protocol (see Section 4). The score-threshold may be chosen arbitrarily, but usually some
heuristics are applied when choosing the threshold. Two common approaches for selecting the score-threshold are:
• Select the score-threshold, TEER, corresponding to the equal error rate (EER). That is, TEER is the threshold
for which FMR ≈ FNMR.
• Select the score-threshold, Tθ, that corresponds to a specific FMR = θ (e.g., T0.1 denotes the score-threshold
leading to a FMR of 0.1% over the development group).
For a given score-threshold obtained on the development group, the FMR, FNMR, and HTER can be reported on
the evaluation group.
5.2 Face Verification Performance
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(a) ROC curves for the development group.
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(b) ROC curves for the evaluation group.
Figure 2: Performances of FR systems in licit scenario of the MOBIO dataset. (a) ROC curves for the development
group of the licit protocol of MOBIO. The vertical dashed line marks the point where FMR is 0.1% for every method
(corresponding to the score-threshold T0.1). (b) ROC curves for the evaluation group of the licit protocol of MOBIO.
The colored circular markers (connected by a dashed line) indicate the FMR and FNMR of each FR method, for the
T0.1 score-threshold.
First, we establish a baseline face-verification performance for each FR system, based on the licit protocol of the
MOBIO dataset. The face-verification results of the various FR systems are presented in two ways: using receiver
operating characteristics (ROC) curves and using expected performance curves (EPC) [43].
The ROC curves shown in Figure 2 illustrate the face-verification performances of the various FR systems. They
have been evaluated using the licit male-protocol of the MOBIO dataset. Figure 2(a) and (b) show the ROC plots
for the development group and evaluation group, respectively. A score-threshold, T0.1, is selected so as to achieve
a FMR of 0.1% over the development group. This is indicated in Figure 2(a) by a dashed black vertical line. In
Figure 2(b) the circular markers in the various colors (connected by a dashed trace line) indicate the FMR of the
corresponding FR methods for the score-threshold T0.1. To compare the performances of the five FR methods on the
evaluation group at score-threshold T0.1, we should consider the distances of these five points from the top left corner
of the plot (where (FMR,FNMR) = (0, 0), representing the ideal outcome). This way of comparing different FR
systems follows the method used by NIST [32]. It is clear from the ROC plots that the FaceNet CNN significantly
outperforms the other FR methods in this study. Indeed, it is noteworthy that the verification-accuracy of the
FaceNet CNN remains extremely high even for very small values of FMR.
Expected performance curves (EPC) [43] provide an unbiased comparison of FR systems. Figure 3 shows the
EPC plots of the five FR systems. These curves have been computed using the licit protocol of the MOBIO dataset,
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Figure 3: Comparison of FR systems in licit scenario. The plot shows EPC curves for the five FR systems. The licit
protocol of the MOBIO dataset was used to generate these curves. This plot confirms the conclusion drawn from
Figure 2, that the FaceNet CNN significantly outperforms the other studied FR methods.
and show how the performance of each FR method evolves as a function of the trade-off between FMR and FNMR.
This trade-off is controlled by the parameter 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 as follows:
WER = α× (FMR) + (1− α)× (FNMR) , (8)
where WER (weighted error rate) is the weighted combination of FMR and FNMR. As always, the WER is computed
from the classification results of the development group. Any particular value of WER corresponds to specific values
of α, FMR and FNMR. Therefore, to achieve a specific WER, for a given value of α, the score-threshold should be
chosen appropriately. Specifically, when constructing EPC, we consider a discrete set of values for α. For each value
of α, the score-threshold that minimizes the WER for the development group is chosen. The selected score-threshold
is then used to compute the HTER over the evaluation group, shown in the EPC plots (Fig. 3). Thus, the α values
(on the horizontal axis) and the HTER values of the evaluation group (on the vertical axis of the plot) are related
via the corresponding score-threshold computed from the development group. Fig. 3 confirms that the three CNN
based FR methods perform better than the other two methods (ISV modeling and ROC-SDK). In particular, the
figure also shows that the FaceNet CNN promises significantly better performance than all the other FR methods,
including the popular VGG-Face network.
5.3 Discussion of Face Verification Results
Comparing the two plots in Figure 2, we note that (for the MOBIO male dataset) the performance of the VGG-Face
CNN is not consistent over the two groups. At the operating point corresponding to score-threshold T0.1, on the
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development group, the ROC-SDK and the ISV modeling method, both outperform the VGG-Face CNN. For the
evaluation group, however, the VGG-Face network performs much better. Figure 2(b) shows that the FMR for the
VGG-Face CNN is at least one order of magnitude smaller than the FMR for both the ROC-SDK and the ISV
modeling method. By contrast, the LightCNN and FaceNet networks consistently perform better than the other FR
methods on both groups.
The variable α in Equation 8 is a cost-variable that can be adjusted depending the use-case. If minimizing FMR
(Type I error) is critical, then high values of α are used to determine the score-threshold from the development
group. In the less likely scenario where minimizing FNMR (Type II error) is of utmost importance, very low values
of α should be used. When it is important to optimize both types of errors, α is set to 0.5, which corresponds to
determining the score-threshold TEER.
The EPC plots also indicate that the FaceNet CNN shows near perfect FR performance over almost the entire
range of α values.
Note the initial horizontal segment of the EPC curve for ROC-SDK, indicating a very high HTER for values of
α ≤ 0.1. This results from the peculiarity of the score-distribution produced by the ROC-SDK method. To explain
this behaviour, let us look at the score-distributions shown in Figure 4. The score-distributions produced by the
ROC-SDK for the two classes (genuine presentations in green, and ZEI-presentations in blue) are shown in Figure
4(a). The score-threshold for optimal separation between the two classes increases (along the horizontal axis) with α.
The red line shows this evolution of the score-threshold. Note that the histograms shown in the plot represent score-
distributions of the evaluation group, whereas the red line shows the evolution of the score-threshold as computed
over the development group. Figure 4(b) shows the score-distributions and score-threshold evolution produced by
the VGG-Face CNN.
We can see in Figure 4(a) that for some genuine presentations the ROC-SDK produces very low scores, which
are similar to scores of ZEI presentations. Therefore, for low values of α, where the goal is to minimize FNMR even
at the cost of high FMR, the selected score-threshold is so low that almost every presentation is accepted. This
leads to the near-50% HTER. We do not see this behaviour in the EPC curves of the other FR methods because
these methods do not produce abnormally low scores for genuine presentations. Figure 4(b) shows that the two
score-distributions produced by the VGG-Face network do not have significant overlap, and therefore, even for low
values of α, the selected score-threshold is not very low (relative to the score-distribution of the ZEI class). Therefore,
we see a gradual change at the beginning of the EPC curve for the VGG-Face method, and not a sudden drop as seen
for the ROC-SDK method. Of course, this analysis applies only to the MOBIO male dataset. For other datasets,
the score-distributions produced by the ROC-SDK for the two classes need not have significant overlap.
5.4 Vulnerability Analysis
The trained FR systems are next evaluated with respect to their vulnerability to PAs, using the PA datasets:
REPLAY-ATTACK, MSU-MFSD and REPLAY-MOBILE, as well as a combined PA dataset, created by merging
the three PA datasets. In the combined dataset, the licit protocol consists of the licit protocols of the individual PA
datasets, and similarly, the attack-protocol includes the attack-protocols of the three PA datasets. In each protocol
of the combined dataset, the development group is composed of the development groups of the three constituent PA
datasets, and likewise for the evaluation group. First, the development group of the licit protocol in each PA dataset
is used to determine a score-threshold for classifying genuine- and ZEI-presentations. Presentations in the evaluation
group of the licit protocol are then classified using this score-threshold. These classification results are reported using
the FMR and FNMR metrics. The presentations in the attack protocol of the dataset are also classified using the
same score-threshold, and the results are used to compute the IAPMR.
Vulnerability-analysis results for the five FR systems are summarized in Table 4. For each FR system, the table
shows the results for the three PA datasets individually, as well as the combined PA dataset. The table shows both
the face-verification accuracy as well as the vulnerability of each FR system. Values of the different metrics are
reported for two score-thresholds – TEER, and T0.1 – determined using the development group. The values of the
performance-metrics shown in the table have been computed over the evaluation groups of the various datasets.
On the combined dataset the LightCNN shows the same face-verification performance as the VGG-Face system.
However, the general conclusion drawn from the HTER values in the table is that the FaceNet CNN achieves the
best face-verification performance for all three PA datasets, as well as for the combined dataset.
In Table 4, the IAPMR values for the all three CNN-FR systems are consistently above 90% for all PA datasets
(using both score-thresholds). In fact, when we consider the lower-bounds of the respective confidence-intervals, in
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(a) Score-distribution produced by the ROC-SDK.
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(b) Score-distribution produced the VGG-Face CNN.
Figure 4: Score-distributions of two FR systems in the licit scenario of MOBIO dataset. (a) Histograms of scores
produced by the ROC-SDK method. (b) Score-histograms for the VGG-Face network. In each plot, the green
histogram represents the distribution of scores for genuine presentations, and the blue histogram shows the scores
for the ZEI presentations. These histograms are based on scores computed for the evaluation group. In each plot,
the red line shows the evolution (from left to right) of the score-threshold computed from the development group, as
a function of α (right vertical axis).
a majority of experiments, the CNN-FR systems show vulnerabilities higher than 95%. These experiments clearly
demonstrate that the CNN based FR systems are highly vulnerable to PAs. Comparing the IAPMR values in the
table, we note that both, the ISV modeling method as well as the ROC-SDK method, show levels of vulnerability
significantly lower than those for the three CNN-based systems. For each dataset, the highest IAMPR values are
shown in bold font in the table.
In the experiments where the vulnerability of a FR system is relatively low, the corresponding FNMR is also
unacceptably high. For example, the ISV modeling method shows an IAPMR of 14.8% for the REPLAY-MOBILE
dataset, at score-threshold T0.1. The corresponding FNMR is 50.1%. A system with such a high FNMR would not
be useful in practical applications.
This can also be observed from the score distributions of the FR systems. Figure 5 shows the score distributions
of the FR systems for the combined PA dataset. For every FR system, the score distribution of the PAs (gray
histogram) significantly overlaps the genuine score distribution (green histogram). This indicates that none of the
FR systems is able to adequately distinguish between genuine presentations and attack-presentations. We note,
however, that both, the overlap between the PA-score-histogram and the genuine-score-histogram as well as the
separation between genuine and ZEI score distributions is stronger for all the CNN-based FR systems, compared to
the ISV modeling and ROC-SDK methods. The IAPMR values at TEER shown in the plot (repeated in Table 4) are
higher for the CNN-based methods than the other two FR methods.
The ROC-SDK method failed to generate templates for a certain number of input images, probably be due to
some mechanism for rejecting low-quality input samples. This may explain the relatively lower vulnerability of this
method as some PA (as well as genuine) samples may have been rejected based on their quality. We are not able to
verify this hypothesis, as implementation details of ROC-SDK are not public knowledge.
Table 5 shows the IAPMR values for each PA type (see Table 1 for an explanation of the various PA types in
each dataset). The values in the table show the average success-rate for each type of PA, over the five FR methods.
Clearly, all PA types are highly successful in spoofing all the five FR methods. The table indicates that the FaceNet
CNN was successfully spoofed more often than the other FR methods.
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Table 4: FR accuracy and vulnerability of each FR system are shown for four datasets (the three PA datasets, as
well as the combined dataset). The FR accuracies of five FR methods are reported in terms of FMR and FNMR.
For convenience, the HTER is also reported for each experiment. The table also shows the vulnerability of each FR
method to presentation attacks (IAPMR). The values in the table have been computed on the evaluation group,
based on two different score-thresholds: TEER (corresponding to the EER on the development group), and T0.1
(leading to a FMR of 0.1% on the development group). 95% confidence intervals are shown for the IAPMR values
in brackets. The highest IAPMR and the lowest HTER values for each dataset and score-threshold are highlighted
in bold.
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TABLE IV: FR accuracy and vulnerability of each FR system are shown for four datasets (the three PA datasets, as well as
the combined dataset). The FR accuracies of five FR methods are reported in terms of FMR and FNMR. For convenience, the
HTER is also reported for each experiment. The table also shows the vulnerability of each FR method to presentation attacks
(IAPMR). The values in the table have been computed on the evaluation group, based on two different score-thresholds:
TEER (corresponding to the EER on the development group), and T0.1 (leading to a FMR of 0.1% on the development
group). 95% confidence intervals are shown for the IAPMR values in brackets. The highest IAPMR and the lowest HTER
values for each dataset and score-threshold are highlighted in bold.
FR Method Dataset Score-Threshold @ EER (TEER) Score-Threshold @ FMR = 0.1% (T0.1)FMR FNMR HTER IAPMR FMR FNMR HTER IAPMR
VGG-Face
REPLAY-ATTACK 0.0 0.0 0.0 98.2 [96.4, 99.3] 0.6 0.0 0.3 99.8 [98.6, 100]
MSU-MFSD 0.0 4.0 2.0 92.4 [90.5, 94.1] 0.0 1.3 0.7 93.1 [91.3, 94.7]
REPLAY-MOBILE 0.1 2.5 1.3 95.4 [94.3, 96.3] 0.0 4.4 2.2 90.7 [89.3, 92.0]
Combined 0.3 2.0 1.2 97.0 [96.4, 97.6] 0.0 3.8 1.9 92.7 [91.7, 93.5]
LightCNN
REPLAY-ATTACK 0.1 0.0 0.0 95.0 [92.4, 96.9] 0.1 0.0 0.1 98.0 [96.1, 99.1]
MSU-MFSD 0.0 0.0 0.0 93.4 [91.6, 95.0] 0.4 0.0 0.2 99.9 [99.4, 100]
REPLAY-MOBILE 0.9 1.5 1.2 99.9 [99.6, 100] 0.3 2.1 1.2 99.7 [99.3, 99.9]
Combined 1.0 1.4 1.2 99.8 [99.6, 99.9] 0.5 1.7 1.1 99.6 [99.3, 99.8]
FaceNet
REPLAY-ATTACK 0.0 0.0 0.0 99.5 [98.2, 99.9] 0.5 0.0 0.2 99.5 [98.2, 99.9]
MSU-MFSD 0.0 0.0 0.0 99.0 [98.1, 99.5] 0.0 0.0 0.0 100 [99.6, 100]
REPLAY-MOBILE 0.0 0.5 0.3 99.9 [99.6, 100] 0.0 0.5 0.3 99.8 [99.5, 100]
Combined 0.1 0.5 0.3 99.9 [99.7, 100] 0.0 0.5 0.2 99.8 [99.6, 99.9]
ROC-SDK
REPLAY-ATTACK 2.4 1.2 1.8 89.5 [86.1, 92.3] 0.3 3.8 2.0 87.0 [83.3, 90.1]
MSU-MFSD 14.5 10.7 12.6 83.3 [80.7, 85.7] 0.0 16.0 8.0 77.3 [74.5, 80.0]
REPLAY-MOBILE 3.9 3.6 3.8 91.5 [90.1, 92.7] 0.0 5.2 2.6 87.5 [86.0, 89.0]
Combined 5.0 4.8 4.9 87.8 [86.6, 88.9] 0.1 6.7 3.4 84.5 [83.2, 85.7]
ISV
REPLAY-ATTACK 0.4 0.0 0.2 92.2 [89.2, 94.7] 0.1 1.2 0.7 82.0 [77.9, 85.6]
MSU-MFSD 0.2 12.7 6.5 90.8 [88.7, 92.6] 0.9 6.7 3.8 95.0 [93.4, 96.3]
REPLAY-MOBILE 10.2 5.5 7.9 92.0 [90.7, 93.2] 0.6 50.1 25.3 14.8 [13.3, 16.5]
Combined 9.9 4.7 7.3 94.4 [93.6, 95.2] 0.5 45.0 22.8 36.1 [34.4, 37.7]
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TABLE IV: FR accuracy and vulnerability of each FR system is shown for four datasets, namely, the three PA datasets, as
well as the combined dataset, obtained by merging the three PAD datasets into a single dataset. The FR accuracies of five
FR methods are reported in terms of FMR and FNMR. For convenience, the half total error rate (HTER), computed as the
mean of the FMR and FNMR, is also reported for each experiment. The table also shows the vulnerability of each method to
presentation attacks (IAPMR). The values in the table have been computed on the evaluation group, based on two different
score-thresholds: TEER, the threshold corresponding to the EER on the development group, and T0.1, the threshold leading
to a FMR of 0.1% on the development group. 95% confidence intervals are shown for the IAPMR values in brackets. The
highest IAPMR and the lowest HTER values for each dataset and score-threshold are shown in bold.
FR Method Dataset Score-Threshold @ EER (TEER) Score-Threshold @ FMR = 0.1% (T0.1)FMR FNMR HTER IAPMR FMR FNMR HTER IAPMR
VGG-Face
REPLAY-ATTACK 0.0 0.0 0.0 98.2 [96.4, 99.3] 0.6 0.0 0.3 99.8 [98.6, 100]
MSU-MFSD 0.0 4.0 2.0 92.4 [90.5, 94.1] 0.0 1.3 0.7 93.1 [91.3, 94.7]
REPLAY-MOBILE 0.1 2.5 1.3 95.4 [94.3, 96.3] 0.0 4.4 2.2 90.7 [89.3, 92.0]
Combined 0.3 2.0 1.2 97.0 [96.4, 97.6] 0.0 3.8 1.9 92.7 [91.7, 93.5]
LightCNN
REPLAY-ATTACK 0.1 0.0 0.0 95.0 [92.4, 96.9] 0.1 0.0 0.1 98.0 [96.1, 99.1]
MSU-MFSD 0.0 0.0 0.0 93.4 [91.6, 95.0] 0.4 0.0 0.2 99.9 [99.4, 100]
REPLAY-MOBILE 0.9 1.5 1.2 99.9 [99.6, 100] 0.3 2.1 1.2 99.7 [99.3, 99.9]
Combined 1.0 1.4 1.2 99.8 [99.6, 99.9] 0.5 1.7 1.1 99.6 [99.3, 99.8]
FaceNet
REPLAY-ATTACK 1.2 2.5 1.9 97.5 [95.5, 98.8] 0.2 6.2 3.2 93.2 [90.3, 95.5]
MSU-MFSD 0.0 0.0 0.0 99.0 [98.1, 99.5] 0.0 0.0 0.0 100 [99.6, 100]
REPLAY-MOBILE 0.0 6.3 3.1 100 [99.8, 100] 0.0 7.8 3.9 98.9 [98.3, 99.3]
Combined 0.2 5.4 2.8 99.7 [99.4, 99.9] 0.0 7.1 3.6 98.0 [97.5, 98.5]
ROC-SDK
REPLAY-ATTACK 2.4 1.2 1.8 89.5 [86.1, 92.3] 0.3 3.8 2.0 87.0 [83.3, 90.1]
MSU-MFSD 14.5 10.7 12.6 83.3 [80.7, 85.7] 0.0 16.0 8.0 77.3 [74.5, 80.0]
REPLAY-MOBILE 3.9 3.6 3.8 91.5 [90.1, 92.7] 0.0 5.2 2.6 87.5 [86.0, 89.0]
Combined 5.0 4.8 4.9 87.8 [86.6, 88.9] 0.1 6.7 3.4 84.5 [83.2, 85.7]
ISV
REPLAY-ATTACK 0.4 0.0 0.2 92.2 [89.2, 94.7] 0.1 1.2 0.7 82.0 [77.9, 85.6]
MSU-MFSD 0.2 12.7 6.5 90.8 [88.7, 92.6] 0.9 6.7 3.8 95.0 [93.4, 96.3]
REPLAY-MOBILE 10.2 5.5 7.9 92.0 [90.7, 93.2] 0.6 50.1 25.3 14.8 [13.3, 16.5]
Combined 9.9 4.7 7.3 94.4 [93.6, 95.2] 0.5 45.0 22.8 36.1 [34.4, 37.7]
rejected based on their quality. We are not able to verify
this hypothesis, as implementation details of ROC-SDK are
not public knowledge.
Table V shows the IAPMR values for each PA type (see
Table I for an explanation of the various PA types in each
dataset). The values in the table show the average success-
rate for each type of PA, over the five FR methods. Clearly,
all PA types are highly successful in spoofing all the five
FR methods. The table shows that the FaceNet CNN was
successfully spoofed more often than the other FR methods.
E. Discussion of Vulnerability Analysis Results
In Table V we note that presentations of type PA-III in the
REPLAY-MOBILE dataset are, in general, more successful
in spoofing the FR systems than PA-III presentations in other
datasets. (As described in Table I, PA-III refers to high-
quality video replay attacks.) This observation correlates
with the fact that the PAI used (for video-replay attack
presentations) in the REPLAY-MOBILE dataset is of higher
quality than the PAIs used for video-replay attacks in the
other two, older, datasets. That is, the digital screens used as
PAIs for PA-III videos in the REPLAY-MOBILE dataset are
more recent than those used for creating the older datasets.
Figure 6 shows the most successful and the least success-
ful PAs in attacking the VGG-Face CNN. For each PAD
dataset, sample images are shown for four different clients:
TABLE V: IAPMR values (in percentage) of each of the
three PA types listed in Table I.
FR Method Dataset PA I PA II PA III
VGG-Face
REPLAY-ATTACK 98.8 97.5 98.8
MSU-MFSD 93.3 90.7 93.3
REPLAY-MOBILE 91 99.7
LightCNN
REPLAY-ATTACK 96.2 95.0 94.4
MSU-MFSD 93.3 93.3 93.7
REPLAY-MOBILE 99.8 100
FaceNet
REPLAY-ATTACK 100 95.6 98.1
MSU-MFSD 100 97.0 100
REPLAY-MOBILE 100 100
ROC-SDK
REPLAY-ATTACK 93.8 85 91.9
MSU-MFSD 81.3 86.7 82.0
REPLAY-MOBILE 89.6 93.4
ISV
REPLAY-ATTACK 95 91.2 91.9
MSU-MFSD 95.7 78.3 98.3
REPLAY-MOBILE 87.2 96.8
• on the left, the two sets corresponding to the two
clients with least successful attacks, and
• on the right, two sets of images corresponding to the
two most successful PAs.
The labels on the vertical axis indicate the dataset from
which the examples have been taken. For some images in
the figure, the associated scores from two FR systems – the
VGG-Face CNN, and the ISV modeling method – are also
5.5 Discussion of Vulnerability Analysis Results
In Table 5 we note that PA-III attacks in the REPLAY-MOBILE dataset are generally more successful in spoofing the
FR systems than PA-III presentations in other datasets. (As described in Table 1, PA-III refers to high-quality video
replay attacks.) This observation correlates with the fact that the PAI used (for video-replay attack presentations)
in the REPLAY-MOBILE dataset is of higher quality than the PAIs used for video-replay attacks in the other two,
older, datasets. That is, the digital screens used as PAIs for PA-III videos in the REPLAY-MOBILE dataset are
more recent than those used for creating the older datasets.
Let us look at som specific cases of successful and unsuccessful PAs in detail. Figure 6 shows the most successful
and the least successful P s in attacking the VGG-Face CNN. For each PA dataset, sample images are shown for
four different clients:
• on the left, the two sets corresponding to the two clients with least successful attacks, and
• on the right, two sets of images corresponding to the two most successful PAs.
The labels on the vertical axis indicate the dataset from which the examples have been taken. For some images in
the figure, the associated scores from two FR systems – the VGG-Face CNN, and the ISV modeling method – are
also shown. These scores have been calibrated to a standard scale using Platt scaling [44].Therefore, the score-values
shown in Figure 6 can be seen as face-verification probabilities.
For each dataset, the label on the vertical axis of Figure 6 also shows the calibrated score-thresholds (i.e.,
prob ility-t resholds) for the two FR systems considered in this figure. The first number gives the EER probability-
threshold for the VGG-Face CNN, and the second number gives the EER probability threshold for the ISV modeling
method. (The probability-thresholds are computed over the development group.) For example, the probability-
threshold for the VGG-Face system, for the REPLAY-ATTACK dataset is 0.83, and the probability-threshold for
the ISV modeling method, for the same dataset, is 0.44.
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Figure 5: FR score-distributions for all PA datasets combined. Each plot corresponds to one FR method (shown
above the plot), and shows three histograms of scores – for genuine presentations (green), ZEI presentations (blue)
and attack presentations (gray). The red vertical dashed line marks the score-threshold TEER, corresponding the
EER of the development group (of the licit protocol), for the FR method in question. Samples with scores lower
than TEER are classified as ZEI presentations. In the ideal scenario the blue histogram would lie entirely to the left
of this threshold, and the green histogram would lie entirely to its right. The solid red line shows the IAPMR for
different thresholds. Given a specific score-threshold, the IAPMR of resulting the FR system can be read-off at the
point where the IAPMR curve (solid red curve) intersects the threshold (dashed vertical line).
The figure shows three images for each client – (from left to right) an enrollment sample, a PA sample, and a
genuine probe sample. For the PA and probe samples, the verification probabilities are shown in the figure, for the
two FR systems (the left number is the probability assigned by the VGG-Face system for the image in question, and
the number on the right is the probability estimated by the ISV modeling system). When the probability is equal
to or higher than the corresponding probability-threshold, the score is shown in green (i.e., the presentation was
accepted as genuine). Otherwise, the score is shown in red (i.e., the sample was rejected by the corresponding FR
system).
For all three datasets, the clients in the right half of the figure are those that received the highest scores from the
VGG-Face system. For these cases, both presentations (PA and genuine probe) were also scored highly by the ISV
modeling method. Visual inspection of the images indicates that for all these clients, the probe and PA samples are
well-cropped images, with good frontal pose, captured under reasonably good illumination conditions.
In the left half of the figure, we show the two clients, per dataset, that were assigned the lowest score by the
VGG-Face system. As explained earlier, the probability values in red indicate that the sample was rejected by the
corresponding FR system. For example, the PA sample of the woman in the MSU-MFSD dataset was rejected by
both FR systems. The genuine probe-sample of the same client, however, was rejected by the VGG-Face system, but
accepted by the ISV modeling system. This result is difficult to explain. The eyes in the three images for this client
look well aligned, which indicates that the eye-localization was correct in all three images. In this case, illumination
variations could be to blame for the low scores by the VGG-Face CNN. In some of the other cases we note that either
the enrollment image or the probe-image is not correctly aligned to the image-axes. Note that the images shown
in this figure are normalized face images. Therefore, a misaligned normalized face indicates that the eye-locations
have been incorrectly estimated in the original image, during the normalization process. This error may be due to
insufficient illumination, shadows, or reflections from the eye-wear.
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Table 5: IAPMR (percent) of each of the three PA types listed in Table 1.
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TABLE V: IAPMR (percent) of each of the three PA types
listed in Ta e .
FR Method Dataset PA I PA II PA III
VGG-Face
REPLAY-ATTACK 98.8 97.5 98.8
MSU-MFSD 93.3 90.7 93.3
REPLAY-MOBILE 91 99.7
LightCNN
REPLAY-ATTACK 96.2 95.0 94.4
MSU-MFSD 93.3 93.3 93.7
REPLAY-MOBILE 99.8 100
FaceNet
REPLAY-ATTACK 100 98.8 100
MSU-MFSD 100 97.0 100
REPLAY-MOBILE 99.8 100
ROC-SDK
REPLAY-ATTACK 93.8 85 91.9
MSU-MFSD 81.3 86.7 82.0
REPLAY-MOBILE 89.6 93.4
ISV
REPLAY-ATTACK 95 91.2 91.9
MSU-MFSD 95.7 78.3 98.3
REPLAY-MOBILE 87.2 96.8
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TABLE IV: FR accuracy and vulnerability of each FR system is shown for four datasets, namely, the three PA datasets, as
well as the combined dataset, obtained by merging the three PAD datasets into a single dataset. The FR accuracies of five
FR methods are reported in terms of FMR and FNMR. For convenience, the half total error rate (HTER), computed as the
mean of the FMR and FNMR, is also reported for each experiment. The table also shows the vulnerability of each method to
presentation attacks (IAPMR). The values in the table have been computed on the evaluation group, based on two different
score-thresholds: TEER, the threshold corresponding to the EER on the development group, and T0.1, the threshold leading
to a FMR of 0.1% on the development group. 95% confidence intervals are shown for the IAPMR values in brackets. The
highest IAPMR and the lowest HTER values for each dataset and score-threshold are shown in bold.
FR Method Dataset Score-Threshold @ EER (TEER) Score-Threshold @ FMR = 0.1% (T0.1)FMR FNMR HTER IAPMR FMR FNMR HTER IAPMR
VGG-Face
REPLAY-ATTACK 0.0 0.0 0.0 98.2 [96.4, 99.3] 0.6 0.0 0.3 99.8 [98.6, 100]
MSU-MFSD 0.0 4.0 2.0 92.4 [90.5, 94.1] 0.0 1.3 0.7 93.1 [91.3, 94.7]
REPLAY-MOBILE 0.1 2.5 1.3 95.4 [94.3, 96.3] 0.0 4.4 2.2 90.7 [89.3, 92.0]
Combined 0.3 2.0 1.2 97.0 [96.4, 97.6] 0.0 3.8 1.9 92.7 [91.7, 93.5]
LightCNN
REPLAY-ATTACK 0.1 0.0 0.0 95.0 [92.4, 96.9] 0.1 0.0 0.1 98.0 [96.1, 99.1]
MSU-MFSD 0.0 0.0 0.0 93.4 [91.6, 95.0] 0.4 0.0 0.2 99.9 [99.4, 100]
REPLAY-MOBILE 0.9 1.5 1.2 99.9 [99.6, 100] 0.3 2.1 1.2 99.7 [99.3, 99.9]
Combined 1.0 1.4 1.2 99.8 [99.6, 99.9] 0.5 1.7 1.1 99.6 [99.3, 99.8]
FaceNet
REPLAY-ATTACK 1.2 2.5 1.9 97.5 [95.5, 98.8] 0.2 6.2 3.2 93.2 [90.3, 95.5]
MSU-MFSD 0.0 0.0 0.0 99.0 [98.1, 99.5] 0.0 0.0 0.0 100 [99.6, 100]
REPLAY-MOBILE 0.0 6.3 3.1 100 [99.8, 100] 0.0 7.8 3.9 98.9 [98.3, 99.3]
Combined 0.2 5.4 2.8 99.7 [99.4, 99.9] 0.0 7.1 3.6 98.0 [97.5, 98.5]
ROC-SDK
REPLAY-ATTACK 2.4 1.2 1.8 89.5 [86.1, 92.3] 0.3 3.8 2.0 87.0 [83.3, 90.1]
MSU-MFSD 14.5 10.7 12.6 83.3 [80.7, 85.7] 0.0 16.0 8.0 77.3 [74.5, 80.0]
REPLAY-MOBILE 3.9 3.6 3.8 91.5 [90.1, 92.7] 0.0 5.2 2.6 87.5 [86.0, 89.0]
Combined 5.0 4.8 4.9 87.8 [86.6, 88.9] 0.1 6.7 3.4 84.5 [83.2, 85.7]
ISV
REPLAY-ATTACK 0.4 0.0 0.2 92.2 [89.2, 94.7] 0.1 1.2 0.7 82.0 [77.9, 85.6]
MSU-MFSD 0.2 12.7 6.5 90.8 [88.7, 92.6] 0.9 6.7 3.8 5.0 [93.4, 96.3]
REPLAY-MOBILE 10.2 5.5 7.9 92.0 [90.7, 93.2] 0.6 50.1 25.3 14.8 [13.3, 16.5]
Combined 9.9 4.7 7.3 94.4 [93.6, 95.2] 0.5 45.0 22.8 36.1 [34.4, 37.7]
rejected based on their quality. We are not able to verify
this hypothesis, as implementation details of ROC-SDK are
not public knowledge.
Table V shows the IAPMR values for each PA type (see
Table I for an explanation of the various PA types in each
dataset). The values in the table show the average success-
rate for each type of PA, over the five FR methods. Clearly,
all PA types are highly successful in spoofing all the five
FR methods. The table shows that the FaceNet CNN was
successfully spoofed more often than the other FR methods.
E. Discussion of Vulnerability Analysis Results
In Table V we note that presentations of type PA-III in the
REPLAY-MOBILE dataset are, in general, more successful
in spoofing the FR systems than PA-III presentations in other
datasets. (As described in Table I, PA-III refers to high-
quality video replay attacks.) This observation correlates
with the fact that the PAI used (for video-replay attack
presentations) in the REPLAY-MOBILE dataset is of higher
quality than the PAIs used for video-replay attacks in the
other two, older, datasets. That is, the digital screens used as
PAIs for PA-III videos in the REPLAY-MOBILE dataset are
more recent than those used for creating the older datasets.
Figure 6 shows the most successful and the least success-
ful PAs in attacking the VGG-Face CNN. For each PAD
dataset, sample images are shown for four different clients:
TABLE V: IAPMR values (in percentage) of each of the
three PA types listed in Table I.
FR Method Dataset PA I PA II PA III
VGG-Face
REPLAY-ATTACK 98.8 97.5 98.8
MSU-MFSD 93.3 90.7 93.3
REPLAY-MOBILE 91 99.7
LightCNN
REPLAY-ATTACK 96.2 95.0 94.4
MSU-MFSD 93.3 93.3 93.7
REPLAY-MOBILE 99.8 100
FaceNet
REPLAY-ATTACK 100 95.6 98.1
MSU-MFSD 100 97.0 100
REPLAY-MOBILE 100 100
ROC-SDK
REPLAY-ATTACK 93.8 85 91.9
MSU-MFSD 81.3 86.7 82.0
REPLAY-MOBILE 89.6 93.4
ISV
REPLAY-ATTACK 95 91.2 91.9
MSU-MFSD 95.7 78.3 98.3
REPLAY-MOBILE 87.2 96.8
• on the left, the two sets corresponding to the two
clients with least successful attacks, and
• on the right, two sets of images corresponding to the
two most successful PAs.
The labels on the vertical axis indicate the dataset from
which the examples have been taken. For some images in
the figure, the associated scores from two FR systems – the
VGG-Face CNN, and the ISV modeling method – are also
6 Conclusions
For trustworthy face-biometrics systems, high face-verification accuracy and robustness to presentation attacks (PA)
are equally important. In recent years deep learning based face-recognition (FR) methods have captured the interest
of biometrics researchers, because they have been shown to outperform preceding methods by a wide margin. In
this paper, we have empirically verified the hypothesis that the higher the face-verification accuracy of a FR system,
the higher is its vulnerability to PA. This is the first study to empirically explore the vulnerability of CNN-based
FR systems to a variety of PA. For comparison, we have also included two other FR methods not explicitly based
on CNNs. Specifically, we have studied the robustness of five FR methods to PA, namely, three CNN-based FR
methods (VGG-Face, LightCNN and FaceNet), Inter-session Variability (ISV) modeling method, which relies on
hand-crafted features, and the ROC-SDK, a commercial FR product. The three CNN-based FR methods as well as
the ISV modeling method are not explicitly designed to detect PAs. (No claim can be made about the ROC-SDK
as implementation details for this product are not publicly available.) Therefore, one would intuitively expect these
methods to be vulnerable to PAs.
The face-verification performance and vulnerability to PA of the various FR systems are reported using recently
standardized ISO metrics. Our experiments, conducted on three publicly available PA datasets, show that, while all
the studied FR systems are highly vulnerable to PAs, the three CNN-based FR methods are all more vulnerable to
PAs than the other two methods (based on the IAPMR values and confidence-intervals shown in Table 4). Among
the three CNN-based methods, the FaceNet based FR method, which shows the best FR performance, is also most
vulnerable to PA.
The experimental results presented in this paper are noteworthy for the following reasons.
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• Face-verification performances of the various CNN-FR systems, previously evaluated only on the LFW dataset,
are confirmed using a widely used face-verification dataset (MOBIO) as well as several recent publicly available
PA datasets.
• Although the FR methods studied here have always been intuitively considered to be vulnerable to PAs, these
are the first experiments to quantify this vulnerability empirically, based on large-scale study using several
PA datasets. The experiments also demonstrate that raw FR performance alone does not make a FR method
suitable in face-verification applications.
• Our experiments clearly demonstrate that FR methods with higher FR accuracy also show higher levels of
vulnerability to PA.
• Since these experiments have involved publicly available PA datasets, the numerical results presented here can
serve as baseline performance-values for researchers in the field of face-PAD.
These results make a clear case for incorporating explicit countermeasures to make FR systems significantly
robust to PAs. In future work, we will study the impact of combining these FR methods with a PAD system.
The FR systems studied in this work have all been trained only for face-recognition. The next logical step is to
expressly take PAs into account when training the FR systems. Such experiments would have greatly enlarged the
scope of the current work. In a subsequent work we plan to show results of training a CNN for FR, when PAs are
explicitly identified as a separate class.
The datasets used in our experiments are already publicly available. Python code for all the experiments and
test-protocols discussed in this paper is publicly available5.
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Figure 6: Examples of unsuccessful and most successful PAs in attacking the VGG-Face system. The three images
on the left are associated with the unsuccessful PAs and the three images on the right are associated with the most
successful PAs. Two sets of examples (two rows) is shown from each dataset. Three images are shown for each client:
(left) an enrollment sample, (middle) example PA, and (right) the genuine probe image that has the closest score to
that of the corresponding PA sample. For each dataset, the EER probability-thresholds are shown on the y-axis label
for the VGG-Face and ISV systems, respectively. For each PA sample and probe sample, verification-probabilities
assigned by the VGG-Face system (left) and the ISV modeling system (right) are indicated below the sample. The
verification-probability is red if a sample is rejected using the EER probability-threshold and green otherwise.
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